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Introduction
The EU policy discussion on establishing an institu-
tional architecture for safeguarding EU financial sta-
bility is taking place along both political and technical
tracks. The former is occurring at EU, euro-zone,
regional, and national levels and the latter at policy-
making and expert-working levels in and across the rel-
evant monetary, supervisory and regulatory au-
thorities. Despite progress in achieving some pan-Eu-
ropean agreements (for example, memoranda of un-
derstanding), there has been limited progress in envi-
sioning, no less designing, a European architecture for
safeguarding stability in the EU financial system.
At the same time, there is a dearth of rigorous eco-
nomic analysis asking broader yet no less relevant
questions: What is the optimal decision-making
framework for establishing a financial stability
framework for safeguarding pan-European financial
stability? or What is the least-cost way of organizing
an EU architecture for safeguarding stability?
This article tries to fill part of this “analytical”gap by
introducing and discussing, in a non-technical way,
one analytical approach that could be useful for
examining these broader questions and their impli-
cations for European financial-stability arrange-
ments.1 The approach is that of the “economics of
alliances” developed by Olson (1965) to analyze the
nature of decision making by a group of nations
(NATO) desiring to create a deterrence against a
common outside threat.As in the case of an interna-
tional alliance,in the EU,there are a large number of
member countries and the need for providing multi-
ple public goods (e.g.,financial stability,investor pro-
tection, market regulations and other public goods).
The overall objectives of this article are threefold:
(1) to summarize briefly the ongoing debate on the
establishment of EU financial stability arrange-
ments; (2) to characterize EU financial stability as a
transnational public good;and (3) to provide model-
based benchmarks for assessing the ability of
Europe’s existing institutional architecture and deci-
sion-making processes to safeguard the stability of
EU financial system against systemic threats – such
as the insolvency of a cross-border European bank.
Importance of cross-border banking in the EU
The development of a single financial market has
been a long-term objective of the European Union
(EU).2 The fulfillment of this objective received a
significant further impetus with the introduction of
the euro, which has acted in many ways as a catalyst
for change in monetary and financial affairs. The
importance of this impetus has arisen both as a part
of the goal of developing a single EU financial mar-
ket and as an effective mechanism to facilitate the
implementation of a common monetary policy
throughout the euro area.
So far, the extent of market integration has varied
considerably across the various financial-market seg-
ments of the European landscape and has depended
to a large extent on the degree of integration of the
respective market infrastructures (ECB 2007). For
example, euro-zone country money markets are the
most highly integrated in part because the euro as a
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Likewise, but less so, a considerable degree of inte-
gration has been achieved in markets in which both
government corporate bonds are traded and the
equity markets are making considerable progress.3
By contrast, while the integration of the banking
markets is increasing in the retail segment, it is still
more fragmented than the wholesale market. For
example,cross-border exposures of EU banks in EU
countries rose by some 160 percent from 2000 to
2006 (Tieman and C ^ihák 2007).4 In the euro area,
the cross-border component in banks’ capital mar-
ket-related holdings and interbank holdings has
clearly increased in recent years.
The Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA), once fully
implemented, will enhance the integration of the
European retail payment infrastructure and is
expected to foster further integration in that banking
segment. A key channel for the development of
cross-border banking activities is that of cross-bor-
der M&A operations. Although pan-European
banks could have developed long ago, cross-border
banking remained rather limited until the launching
of the euro. An indicator of the increased role of
cross-border banking is the growing market share of
major cross-border banking groups both in terms of
number of institutions and volume of activity.5
Although legally permitted under the Societas
Europeae, there are no banks with EU charters.6
This reflects the fact that the EU institutional archi-
tecture for financial stability is decentralized, with
the performance of these functions based, in large
part, on the exercise of national responsibilities and
accountability.This contrasts with, for example, part
of the US architecture where repeated banking crisis
encouraged authorities to federalize lender of last
resort, deposit insurance and bank resolution res-
ponsibilities long before banks crossed state lines in
large numbers (Garcia 2008).7
More recently, there has been a growing recognition
by EU policy makers and politicians that, along with
substantial benefits, the emergence of a European
financial system will most likely be accompanied by
a greater propensity for market turbulence, cross-
border contagion, and regional and European sys-
temic risk. So far, opinions on how to proceed are
lining up along national and regional political lines
with some encouraging, cautious attention being
paid to safeguarding European financial stability.
Indeed, at the time of writing this article, the global
and European financial systems were being tested by
the global financial turbulence triggered by the US
sub-prime mortgage crisis.Some European countries
have experienced banking problems as a result of
this turbulence – notably involving Northern Rock
in the UK and IKB and SachsenLB in Germany. In
addition, although one very large cross-border
European financial institution (UBS) has experi-
enced significant losses and writedowns, it has been
able to raise additional capital privately.Thus, so far,
Europe has not faced a serious challenge in manag-
ing an important cross-border banking problem. In
addition, liquidity interventions by the ECB and
other central banks have been prompt and well co-
ordinated. For example, several central banks,
including the Bank of Canada, the ECB, the US
Federal Reserve, and the Swiss National Bank
(SNB) announced extraordinary joint operational
measures to deal with 2007 year-end liquidity
demands (ECB 2008).
Does the policy debate on the EU safety net
recognize the lack of incentive to co-operate in
safeguarding financial stability?
In 2004, for the first time, national authorities in the
EU explicitly recognized the limitations of the exist-
ing institutional framework for bank crisis manage-
ment in Europe. This recognition occurred at the
highest European policy level by the Council of
Economic and Financial Affairs (ECOFIN), com-
prised of the ministers responsible for economic
affairs and finance in the EU.8 It came after a long,
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mostly academic debate that had been highlighting
for many years that the existing nationally-oriented
financial safety nets within the EU provided few
incentives for minimizing losses to taxpayers and
encouraged delayed solutions likely to substantially
increase taxpayer losses (see among others Prati and
Schinasi 1999; Goodhart 2000; Holthausen and
Ronde 2005; Nieto and Wall 2006; Schinasi and
Teixeira 2006; Eisenbeis and Kaufman 2006; and
Mayes, Nieto and Wall 2008).
In the particular case of banks, the incentives are
such that the interdependence of prudential super-
vision of banks operating across borders creates a
principal-agent relationship between the taxpayers
of one country as principal and the various super-
visors of the rest of the banking group as agents.9
In addition, the principal/agent problems in this
case are made substantially worse because some of
the principals may not have direct authority over
the agent, as when a supervisory authority in one
country may expose the taxpayers in another coun-
try to losses. The problem is that the agent’s in-
centives are to achieve the objectives of the prin-
cipal that has some direct authority over the agent.
That is, when conflicts arise among the principals,
the supervisor (agent) is likely to follow the per-
ceived interests of their own country’s government
and voters (principal).This is likely to increase tax
payers’ fiscal costs, which, in turn, would further
complicate the sharing of resolution-costs among
countries.
Since 2004, several initiatives by the European
Commission, EU Parliament, the European Central
Bank and the Council – as well as by the technical
committees under their aegis – have been adopted in
order to improve the explicit co-operation among
safety net regulators in the EU.10 The existing co-
operation structures range from legal provisions
(e.g., Capital Requirement Directive11) to legally
non-binding guidelines of common forums (e.g.,
EFC, CEBS, CESR, CEIOPS) and memoranda of
understanding (MoU).12
From the perspective of the benchmark models dis-
cussed below, this ongoing process of co-operative
and co-ordinated decision and policy-making can be
characterized as an iterative process in which EU
countries gradually and selectively internalize some
of the negative externalities associated with cross-
border financial problems and instability.This ongo-
ing process can thus be seen as one way of moving
towards a more desirable European approach to
safeguarding EU financial stability.
As an example, the internalization of potential
negative externalities in the European payment
system is almost complete in the case of large value
payments (TARGET2). By contrast, the process of
internalization is far from complete in the case of
safety nets for European cross-border banks and,
so, there remain potentially large negative cross-
border externalities that may not be captured by
the agglomeration of existing nationally oriented
safety nets for banks. For example, the enhanced
role of the consolidating supervisor will result in a
significant “loss of control” over domestic bank
assets by host country supervisors in countries such
as Luxembourg,Finland,Czech Republic,Hungary
and Poland without giving up parallel responsibili-
ties, for example, in deposit insurance, bank reor-
ganization and winding up.In turn,the responsibil-
ities of some prudential supervisors for banks’
safety and soundness (Belgium and Spain) will
increase considerably without a corresponding
increase in the responsibilities of other safety net
regulators. Co-operation among safety net regula-
tors has occurred mainly between bank supervi-
sors, central banks and national treasuries; it has
been lagging among bank deposit insurers, bank
9 For simplicity, it is assumed that supervisors act as perfect agents
on behalf of their national tax payers.This view is challenged by E.
Kane and others.
10 Note that the implicit co-operation among national regulators
had traditionally taken place via minimum harmonization through
the EU Directives. The above-mentioned committees have been
launched under the aegis of the ECOFIN (Financial Services
Committee, Financial Stability Table and the Economic and
Finance Committee Ad hoc Working Group) the Lamfalussy archi-
tecture (Level 2 and Level 3 Banking Committees) and the
European Central Bank (Banking Supervisory Committee and the
relevant Working Groups).
11 The CRD comprises Directive (2006/48/EC) of 14 June 2006
relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit insti-
tutions, OJ L 177/1, 30 June 2006 and Directive (2006/49/EC) of 14
June 2006 on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit
institutions, OJ L 177/201, 30 June 2006.
12 There are three MoUs currently in place on financial crisis man-
agement of cross-border banks in the EU, one between central
banks and supervisors and two other additionally involving trea-




financialstability2008en.pdf. There are also (generally bilateral)
MoUs among prudential supervisors. The MoUs consist of sets of
principles and procedures that deal specifically with the identifica-
tion of the authorities responsible for crisis management (central
banks, prudential supervisors and ministries of finance) and the
required flows of information between all authorities and the prac-
tical conditions for sharing information at the cross-border level.
The 2008 MoU also includes supervisors of insurance and securities
sectors as well as market infrastructures.In addition to these MoU,
EU banking supervisors and central banks also adopted in 2001 a
MoU about co-operation between payment systems overseers and
banking supervisors, which sets out arrangements for co-operation
and information in relation to large-value payment systems. Press
release available at
http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2001/html/pr010402.en.html.reorganization and winding up authorities, insur-
ance company supervisors and securities markets
regulators.
It can be argued that a significant step toward archi-
tectural design occurred in October 2007 when
Ministers of Finance in the ECOFIN agreed on a
comprehensive approach that,for the first time,con-
sidered the simultaneous reform of the entire EU
safety net. The Council’s report acknowledges the
potential need for the establishment of co-operation
mechanisms to promote and to foster close co-oper-
ation and information sharing, both on an ongoing
basis and within the context of any crisis situation
that might arise.
Below, we identify key areas touched on by the
ECOFIN and developed by other policy forums and
EU legislative bodies. These areas deal with the
explicit recognition of sharing (at least partially) the
cost of supervision; the reduction of information
asymmetries among safety net regulators and a
broad definition of “systemic importance”.We argue
that the door is now open for explicitly internalizing
some of the existing negative externalities:13
• The ECOFIN explicitly recognized an EU dimen-
sion in the mandate of national prudential super-
visors, which encompasses the use of the resour-
ces of the EU budget to finance specific EU wide
projects of the supervisory committees.Although
not legally enforceable as yet,this recognition is a
relevant political agreement aimed at internaliz-
ing potential negative externalities of the activity
of national supervisors.
• Safety net regulators need to understand and,
hence, to have accurate and timely information
on the overall financial condition of a banking
group and financial infrastructures if they are to
effectively anticipate problems and take appro-
priate corrective measures. This has been recog-
nized in the CRD (Art.132) by requiring supervi-
sors to provide one another with any information
which is essential or relevant for the exercise of
the other authorities’ supervisory tasks.This legal
provision has been further specified with the need
to reach agreements on the disclosure require-
ments for “significant” subsidiaries, on reporting
for the calculation of minimum regulatory re-
quirements,on the treatment of intra-group expo-
sures for large exposures and on own funds re-
quirements in excess of the minimum level (Eu-
ropean Commission 2008).14 The recognition of
the importance to share information encompass-
es also systemically important financial infra-
structures operating across borders (e.g., TAR-
GET, trading and post-trading systems) (MoU
2008).The provisions of the MoUs are not legally
binding; however, the fact that the 2008 MoU is
public makes the explicit pre-commitments more
likely.An ex ante commitment can affect the out-
come by raising the cost of reneging the com-
mitment. Pre-commitment arguably raises this
cost by making any decision to renege transpar-
ent to all.15
• Once information asymmetries have been mini-
mized, the process of making decisions needs to
encompass all the parties involved.In the particu-
lar case of cross-border banks, the decision
process takes place in “colleges of supervisors”,
which in light of the Commission proposal (2008)
also encompass the host prudential supervisors of
systemically important branches (implicitly rec-
ognizing the potential negative externalities that
their business activity may cause in the host coun-
try).16 Another welcome proposal by the Euro-
pean Commission refers to the requirement that
prudential supervisors of the host and home
countries decide jointly on the designation of
branches and subsidiaries of systemic importance
in the host country.
• The 2008 MoU not only expands the safety net
regulators involved in crisis management but also
is applicable to crisis situations regardless of its
origin, affecting the stability of the financial sys-
tem in at least one country with impact in other
countries.
Although all of the above are steps in the right direc-
tion,they fall short of fully internalizing the potential
negative externalities that result from the existing
national orientations and biases of financial safety
nets and financial-sector policies. The next two sec-
tions provide the analytical underpinnings for
achieving greater internalization of the negative
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13 Council of the European Union,Economic and Financial Affairs,
9 October 2007. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_-
Data/docs/pressData/en/ecofin/96351.pdf. These proposals were
further developed in the Report to the Informal ECOFIN meeting
on actions to develop EU financial stability arrangements
(Brussels, 3 April 2008) ECOFIN/CEFCPE(2008)REP/51731.
14 CRD potential changes proposed by the EU Commission (DG
Internal Markets and Services, Brussels, 16 April 2008).
15 Similar reasoning can be used for the “comply or explain” prin-
ciple to be applied to the decisions taken by the Level 3
Committees of supervisors, which strengthens the ex ante commit-
ment of EU supervisors to abide by their decisions.
16 In case of disagreement, referrals correspond to CEBS in order
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Forum
externalities associated with European cross-border
financial problems and instability – as part of a grea-
ter effort in establishing a European architecture for
safeguarding EU financial stability.
Properly framing Europe’s financial-stability
challenge as providing transnational (or pan-
European) public goods
As the ongoing European debate makes clear,
European financial stability is being viewed in some
cases as a transnational public good.17 The opera-
tional significance of this in the European context is
that achieving and safeguarding financial stability
requires both collective decision-making and action,
at times involving private stakeholders,at times pub-
lic stakeholders (including politicians and policy
makers), and at times combinations of both.
Safeguarding financial stability is challenging within
one legal jurisdiction, because it requires significant
resources and collective action. The challenges are
greater within a multi-country and decentralized
decision-making framework such as the EU’s. The
added difficulty is that the public-good benefits of
EU financial stability arise through the efforts and
resources (expenditures) of individual countries
whose primary objective is national financial stabili-
ty and not European.
The decision-making problem faced by policy mak-
ers in the EU can be viewed as one in which an
alliance of a large number of countries (27 in the EU
or 13 in the euro area) independently decide to
devote economic resources to produce public goods
that safeguard the stability of its national financial
system – through market surveillance,and regulation
and supervision of financial institutions, including
bank resolution policies. Each country does so
knowing that there is some unquantifiable threat of
financial instability to Europe as a whole (i.e.,conta-
gion), for example, relating to cross-border bank
problems. At the same time, no single or collective
entity devotes resources to safeguard the stability of
the European financial system – or the amalgama-
tion of these integrated national financial systems.18
Individual country decisions are made with the
knowledge, or at least the presumption, that they
may be both conveying benefits to non-citizens and
receiving benefits from the actions of other
European countries.Because each nation knows this,
there may be incentives for some to free ride on the
benefits provided by others (e.g., more prudential
supervision) and thereby devote a lower level of
resources to financial stability than is optimal
nationally.
This is a dilemma faced by European policy makers
that the models developed below make transparent.
If each nation makes independent decisions in pro-
viding a public-good in the form of financial stabili-
ty, then there is the possibility that each country will
devote an insufficient amount of resources to safe-
guarding EU financial stability as a whole and, in
some countries, perhaps an insufficient level of
resources nationally as well. While well-known in
welfare economics, this conclusion and its implica-
tions have rarely been analyzed within this financial-
stability context. Moreover, the models introduced
below have several important implications for the
current European debate.
Evaluating EU financial stability arrangements
from the perspective of the “economics of
alliances”
This section examines the implications of two simple
models that provide objective benchmarks for eval-
uating aspects of the ongoing debate in the EU, such
as the implications of decentralized versus central-
ized decision making and the benefits versus costs of
ex ante burden sharing agreements for resolving
threats to financial stability (or what amounts to the
same thing in the models, to producing the optimal
amount of financial-stability benefits).The first sub-
section examines the implications of a decentralized
decision making in allocating resources to the pro-
duction of a “pure” public good that conveys bene-
fits to all countries and citizens within a group of
countries. The second subsection then goes on to
examine the production of a public good that con-
veys some exclusive public-good benefits to the
country that provides it and some pure public-good
benefits to all other countries as well.This joint-pub-
17 Chapter 5 in Schinasi (2006) defines financial stability and rea-
sons for seeing it as a public good. Financial stability can be con-
sidered a pure public good in the same way the provision of nation-
al defense is considered one, because it provides non-excludable
and non-rival benefits. Benefits are non-excludable if the
provider/producer of the good cannot exclude others from the ben-
efits without incurring significant costs.The benefits are non-rival if
consumption by one agent does not reduce benefits to others.The
provision of EU financial stability would have these characteristics
for all member countries and their citizens.
18 In this simplified scheme, the “quality” (of the public good) is
considered constant and the “quantity” varies across countries.lic-good model encompasses the pure model, and
results of the two models can be compared.
To our knowledge, the “economics of alliances” ap-
proach has not been applied to analyze the chal-
lenges now facing financial-stability policy makers in
the EU.This approach analyzes the nature of “equi-
librium”outcomes that can arise when members of a
group of optimizing decision makers share the bene-
fits of a public good (or the costs of its absence) and
must decide how to allocate their own scarce
resources to contribute to its production.Within this
framework, the implications of a variety of decision
and policy-making processes can be modeled and
analyzed.
That this can help to sort through some of the diffi-
cult financial-stability issues in the EU should be
obvious. For example, EU stakeholders that share in
the benefits of European financial stability (or who
share the costs of its absence) can be viewed as hav-
ing the option (1) to continue to make decentralized
public-good decisions focusing primarily on national
objectives or (2) to form coalitions that make joint
and mutually advantageous allocations of coalition
resources aimed at maximizing coalition public-good
benefits. In the context of the models, socially opti-
mal decision making for the EU as a whole would
imply the full internalization of potential externali-
ties in the decision-making process (for example, via
central data bases of banks’ financial condition; full
convergence of prudential regulation and superviso-
ry practices; a common budget authority) without
necessarily implying a new centralized European
institution.The most inclusive coalition would be all
European countries; less inclusive would be the EU;
even less inclusive would be the euro area countries.
Each coalition can have separate yet related objec-
tives.One can also imagine a coalition of large coun-
tries or of small countries or both considering
whether it is to their advantage to design a shared
prevention and resolution framework of their own
that optimizes the utilization of their joint resources.
It is an advantage of the “economics of alliances”
that one can analyze and then compare the charac-
teristics of the optimal outcomes consistent with, on
the one hand, a decentralized decision making
process (for example, Nash equilibrium), and on the
other hand, more co-operative decision making
process, as described in the previous paragraph,
which could result in Pareto-efficient equilibrium
allocations for the group as a whole.
Decentralized decision-making in providing a
“pure” public good (such as European-wide
financial stability) 
The logic of a simple model can be briefly summa-
rized as follows.
Each member of a group of countries (the EU)
chooses an allocation of resources to produce a pub-
lic good that conveys benefits to other countries in
the group. The benefits can be seen, for example, as
the resolution of threats to the stability of the
European financial system, such as the insolvency of
a pan-European bank. Each country chooses a re-
source allocation so as to maximize its own welfare
subject to two constraints: (1) its income constraint
(say,GDP),which requires that the cost of producing
both an index of private goods and the public good
does not exceed the nation’s income and (2) the pre-
sumption that each other country chooses an optimal
resource allocation conditional on every other coun-
try doing likewise. The second constraint is relevant
because all countries contribute to, and share the
benefits of, the public good. Each country knows this
and makes its decision presuming that all other mem-
ber countries are also choosing optimal mixes of pri-
vate and public goods conditional on all other coun-
tries behaving similarly.While not an exact indicator,
a country’s GDP relative to total GDP of the alliance
of countries (Europe) can be seen as proxy for the
volume of the country’s financial activities relative to
the size of the European financial system. One can
think of noteworthy exceptions, but they are ignored
here for simplicity but can be explicitly accommodat-
ed in more elaborate models.In what follows,size can
be taken as providing some indication of the poten-
tial for (1) spillovers of negative externalities of
financial difficulties to the wider European financial
system and (2) “spill-ins” of benefits of country-spe-
cific public goods to other countries in Europe.
Characterized as such, the simultaneous decision-
making process faced by each member of the
alliance of countries has many of the features of a
non-co-operative mathematical game,the solution of
which is a Nash equilibrium.The Nash solution is an
equilibrium in the sense that no country has the
incentive to alter its optimal allocation of resources
if all other countries maintain theirs.That is,the mar-
ginal benefits on other allies are ignored.
Keeping the exercise relatively simple – and consis-
tent with Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) – requires a
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number of important simplifying assumptions: (i) all
countries share the benefits of a single pure public
good (as opposed to an imperfect public or club
good, with some exclusively private benefits); (ii)
preferences of citizens in each country can be repre-
sented in a continuous and twice differentiable utili-
ty function; (iii) the cost of producing a unit of the
common public good is fixed, valued in terms of the
“numeraire” private good, and is identical in each
country; (iv) all decisions are made simultaneously;
and (v) the public good produced by one country is
the same as another (perfect substitutability).
This optimization exercise can be shown to have the
following interesting and relevant implications for the
European discussion.19 First,as is well known in other
contexts, the decentralized (Nash) equilibrium level
of provision of the European financial-stability pubic
good would be suboptimal relative to the Pareto-opti-
mal level that would be achieved by maximizing EU
welfare (rather than each countries’ welfare). Even
though each country chooses an optimal resource al-
location to produce a private/ public good output mix,
the resulting European equilibrium will be subopti-
mal. It is sub-optimal because no country considers
the costs and benefits of providing the pure financial-
stability public good for other European countries
and their citizens. Consequently, the group of coun-
tries will jointly provide a sub-optimal level of the
public good compared to co-ordinated decisions in
which even only some of the positive externalities
(benefits) from collective action can be internalized
and distributed to all European countries.
Second, because of the decentralized decision mak-
ing,some (smaller) countries might find it optimal to
free-ride.This would be reflected in the country dis-
tribution of the supply of the public good. More
specifically, the optimal allocation of the burden of
safeguarding financial stability (or sharing the costs
of resolving a cross-border banking problem) falls
disproportionately on larger (higher income) coun-
tries – in that they provide a share of the public good
that exceeds their GDP share in the group of coun-
tries. That is, in Nash equilibrium, a large country’s
share in providing the group’s total public good will
exceed its GDP share in the alliance.
Third, in Nash equilibrium, member countries’
propensities to provide the pure public good (that is,
their policy reactions to a threat to their financial
stability) will depend on four factors:country-specif-
ic income, the relative cost of producing financial
stability, the aggregate amount of resources devoted
to financial stability by other member countries, and
the commonly perceived threat of financial instabili-
ty. If all factors were in fact measurable, these de-
rived policy reaction functions would be estimable.
Fourth, in the context of the burden-sharing debate,
if a matching of benefits received and costs incurred
to preserve financial stability is to be achieved, then
at least some form of co-ordination of resource allo-
cation decisions, if not full internalization of the
externalities, would be required.The recent EU pol-
icy initiatives referred to above that consider cross-
border implications for EU financial stability can be
seen as a move in this direction.
Fifth, addition of new member countries (e.g., EU
enlargement) would imply additional marginal bene-
fits to the group as a whole (more contributors) with-
out a diminution in the benefits for existing member
countries to the extent that public goods are non-
excludable and non-rival (as the model assumes) and
the threat to financial stability is not increased.
These implications are conditional on the assump-
tions made, and will change if some of the assump-
tions of the model are relaxed or altered. For exam-
ple, if one allows for country differences in the mar-
ginal cost of producing the pure public good,optimal
decentralized decision making would imply that the
more efficient countries would take on a larger share
of the EU wide costs,regardless of their size.Thus,by
relaxing this assumption, a country with a compara-
tive advantage in providing, for example, efficient
and relatively reliable clearing and settlement ser-
vices for financial transactions, might end up devot-
ing a greater amount of resources to producing this
particular good to the benefit of all Europeans.
A more realistic but more complicated model:
providing both “exclusive” (nationally-oriented
financial stability) and “pure” public goods
(European-wide financial stability) 20
Countries in Europe provide financial-stability pub-
lic goods whose benefits are also country-specific
19 See Schinasi (2007) for a demonstration of these results.
20 Deviations from the “pure” public good model of Olson and
Zeckhauser (1966) were first examined in Ypersele de Strihou
(1967) and later generalized by Sandler and Cauley (1975),Sandler
(1977) and Cornes and Sandler (1984). This section applies the
analysis in these papers.and conveyed exclusively to economic agents resid-
ing within the country. For example, countries in
Europe have country-specific deposit insurance
schemes that protect domestic depositors in seg-
ments of the national banking system that are exclu-
sive retail, domestic financial institutions (such as,
for example, the Sparkassen in Germany). By con-
trast,there are elements of the EU safety net such as
prudential regulation or parts of financial infrastruc-
tures in European countries – such as large-value
payments systems – that require domestic public
expenditures and public maintenance but which nev-
ertheless convey public good benefits to non-resi-
dents across the European financial landscape.
Once the possibility of “exclusive” or “impure” pub-
lic goods are acknowledged and accounted for, the
nature of the decision-making process within a coun-
try and among a group of countries changes as do
the country and potential collective implications. In
particular, while the set up of the model is the same
as before, the public good conveys two types of ben-
efits: “exclusive” public-good benefits that convey
only to the citizens of that specific country,and “fully
shared”public-good benefits to all other members of
the group of countries (i.e., non-contagion or
absence of European systemic crisis).A key parame-
ter in this model is the share of “exclusive” benefits
to the producing country relative to total benefits to
all of Europe.
The implications of this more complicated model can
be summarized as follows. First, the simultaneous
decisions of countries still results in a Nash equilibri-
um. Consistent with the “pure” public good model,
other countries’ welfare are unaccounted for in each
country’s decisions and so the resulting Nash equi-
librium is still sub-optimal compared to one in which
the decision making process internalizes the exter-
nalities. Achieving the Pareto optimal allocation of
resources in this decision-making process would
require that all other countries’ benefits and costs be
considered in each country’s optimal decisions – a
veritable co-ordinated decision making process.
The literature on the economics of alliances suggests
that the existence of joint products could in reality
provide greater incentives for collective action and
coalition forming than the case of the pure goods
model.As Sandler and Sargent (1995) demonstrated,
a joint-products’ view may result in a co-ordination
game where one of the Nash equilibrium would have
all countries contributing to the collective action. If
the “pure”public-good benefits are a sufficient share
of total benefits, then contributing to the activity
may even be a dominant strategy.That is, if co-ordi-
nation allows countries to take advantage of coun-
try-specific benefits as well as excludable public ben-
efits,then the payoff pattern may be more conducive
to encouraging all countries to make contributions
to the “fully shared” public-good. Thus, the mix of
joint products and their publicness can influence
how coalitions and alliances are formed.
Second, the greater the exclusive benefits are to a
particular country relative to total benefits,the lower
will be the extent to which the cost of providing
shared benefits will fall disproportionately on larger
countries.This is because as exclusive benefits take a
greater share of total benefits (and as national finan-
cial stability becomes the exclusive benefit), smaller
countries may capture fewer shared benefits and
devote more of their resources to produce exclusive
public goods. In other words, when there are country
specific benefits,small countries have a greater incen-
tive to produce the public good (financial stability).
As the exclusive benefits relative share to total ben-
efits approaches one, market solutions and the for-
mation of “clubs” or “coalitions” are capable of
yielding solutions that achieve more efficient equi-
librium outcomes (for example, consider the special
coalitions between the Nordic and the Benelux
countries to safeguard financial stability). This
occurs because when there are exclusive country-
specific benefits, more of the benefits of a public
good are received by the country producing it.
Accordingly, equilibrium outcomes are associated
with a greater association between a country’s bene-
fits received and costs incurred, which is welfare
improving for all country members concerned.
Third,as the exclusive benefits relative share to total
benefits increases, the benefits of collective action
through co-operation and alliances declines. In the
limit, when benefits are all exclusive, there are no
shared pubic-good benefits between countries to
internalize.
Fourth,countries with a greater likelihood of threats
to stability – and of causing EU-wide threats – would
contribute more resources to offsetting the resulting
externalities.
Fifth, and consistent with an earlier implication, the
recognition of joint products should result in deci-
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sion making that produces a greater match between
benefits received and cost burdens carried – which is
similar to a benefit principle of taxation.
Sixth, the extent of sub-optimality is not related to
the size of the group of countries if there is a large
share of “exclusive” public-good benefits.
Finally,once “exclusive”public goods – in contrast to
the production of pure public goods – are admitted,
the relation between a country’s resource allocation
to produce the public good and that of other coun-
tries can be positive. This has the implication that a
higher level of spending on the public good in one
country might be associated with a greater level of
expenditure in other countries as well. This would
reduce the tendency toward free riding, and also
raise the level of total benefits received by the group
of countries.That is,in the joint-product model,there
is greater scope for co-operation to move the group
to an equilibrium that is welfare improving relative
to the Nash equilibrium.
Conclusions
In recent years,there has been a growing recognition
of the “efficiency”gaps in providing for EU financial
stability identified in the models described in this
article. Recognition of this gap has led to some tan-
gible efforts to capture some of the potential effi-
ciency gains through legally binding mechanisms and
policy co-ordination via participation in joint forums.
As noted in the article, the ongoing iterative process
of co-operation and co-ordination through legisla-
tive initiatives committees and MoUs can be inter-
preted as having already internalized some of the
EU potential negative externalities and thereby
moved the EU away from the relatively inefficient
Nash equilibrium toward an improvement in EU sta-
bility closer to the Pareto optimum.In this sense,the
framework presented in the paper is descriptive of
what is going on in the EU; as such, it is potentially
useful for considering what might happen in the
period ahead as EU countries consider how best to
internalize existing externalities.
The public goods considered in this paper can be
thought of either generally as safeguarding (includ-
ing prevention and resolution efforts) the EU finan-
cial system from systemic financial threats or specif-
ically as resolving a European systemic financial
event, such as the illiquidity/insolvency of a pan-
European bank or a pan-European-market-driven
systemic threat to stability. If the decentralized deci-
sion making process described in the models can be
taken as a rough approximation of how European
decisions are made, then several implications of the
“pure” and “exclusive” public good models are
instructive for the ongoing debate in Europe.
First, decentralized decision making in the provision
of EU shared financial-stability public goods results
in an (Nash) equilibrium that is sub-optimal from a
European perspective, even though each country
views its decision as optimal and has no incentive to
change its decision if other countries maintain theirs.
Thus, greater co-ordination and harmonization, if
not full internalization of costs and benefits, could
lead to welfare enhancing improvements relative to
the existing European decentralized architectures
and decision-making processes.
Second, decentralized decision making implies that
the larger countries in Europe will foot a dispropor-
tionately larger share of the overall (and socially
sub-optimal) cost of providing EU financial-stability
pubic goods (including the financial resources to bail
out banks),which implies,in turn,that there may not
be a close matching across countries of the benefits
received and the costs incurred in contributing to the
shared public good. To the extent that the public
goods convey some “exclusive” benefits as well,
there may be a more equal matching of costs and
benefits.
Third,to the extent that each country provides a mix
of both “pure” and “exclusive” financial-stability
public goods, there will be greater incentives for col-
lective action and coalition forming.That is, the mix
of joint public goods and their publicness can influ-
ence how the alliances are formed.In the limit,as the
share of exclusive benefits to total benefits increases,
the gains from collective action through co-opera-
tion and alliances naturally decline.
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